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SMALLER, BEITER, FASTER -NASA'S ULTRALITE EXPENDABLE LAUNCH VEHICLE SERVICES (UELVS)
W. Cutlip
NASA/Goddard Space Flight Center
Greenbelt, Maryland
Abstract
The signing of the Ultralite
Expendable Launch Vehicle Services
(UELVS) contract on December 23,
1994, marked the end of a fasttrack, six-month procurement
process and the beginning of a new
smaller-better-faster" operational
paradigm within NASA's Mixed
Fleet Program. Managed by the
Goddard Space Flight Center's
(GSFC) Orbital Launch Services
Project (OLS), UELVS reflects a
departure from the established
Medium and Small Expendable
Launch Vehicle Services (MELVS
and SEL VS) in both management
philosophy and level of NASA
technical oversight. The intent of
this paper is to discuss the
foundation and implementation of
this paradigm and future plans for
UELVS.
If

Introduction
With the introduction of the
Ultralite Expendable Launch
Vehicle Service (UELVS), NASA has
now filled the "Ultralite" payload
section of NASA's Mixed Fleet
Program. Covering a payload
mass/orbit range of 91 kg/960 km
sunsynch to 227 kg/18S km 38°
inclination, with an associated 18to-24 month kickoff to launch
schedule, UELVS reflects a "smallerbetter-faster" concept for launch
vehicle services.

Managed by the Goddard Space
Flight Center's Orbital Launch
Services Project, UELVS reflects a
departure from the established
Medium and Small Expendable
Launch Vehicle Services, MELVS
and SELVS, respectively, and an
overall desire to reduce launch
vehicle costs and time to launch.
UELVS' Smaller, Better, Faster"
operational paradigm is structured
to provide a Ifwin-win" situation for
all involved:
If

• UELVS' 18-to-24 month
kickoff-to-Iaunch period allows
the graduate students involved
in UEL VS' primary payloadprovided by the Universities
Space Research Association's
(USRA) Student Explorer
Demonstration Initiative
(STEDI)-to see the Iffruits of
their labors" prior to graduation.
• Combining an established
launch vehicle-the Pegasus®
XL-with well-defined electrical
and mechanical payload
interfaces, limited non-standard
services, and reduced NASA
oversight has allowed for the
adoption of a Smaller and
Better" NASA and Orbital
Sciences Corporation (OSC)
management approach and a
$6M price tag for a standard
launch service for the primary
payload.
If
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• Excess launch vehicle payload
volume/performance capability
is available for OSC or NASAmanifested secondary payloads.
Secondary payloads will have
pre-defined electrical and
mechanical interfaces with the
launch vehicle.
This paper details the technical and
programmatic aspects of UEL VS
including gUidelines for primary
and secondary payloads on the
Pegasus® XL vehicle. The paper
also describes how the UELVS team
is proceeding to its scheduled
launches of the SNOE (Student
Nitric Oxide Explorer) and
TERRIERS (Tomographic
Experiment using Radiative
Recombinative Ionospheric
Extreme ultraviolet and Radio
Sources) payloads in March and
April of 1997, respectively.
Background
UELVS has its embryonic origin in
the vision of Dr. Paul Coleman of
the Universities Space Research
Association. In late 1989, Dr.
Coleman initiated an effort within
USRA to identify excess U.S.
Government expendable rocket
assets that could be refurbished to
provide low-cost access to space for
university researchers. On July 31,
1992, following almost two years of
intense discussions involving
personnel from NASA, the U.S. Air
Force, the U.S. Naval Research
Laboratory, and the U.S. House of
Representatives, Dr. Coleman met
with Mr. Dan Goldin, NASA
Administrator, to discuss the
concept of a small missions
complement and the status of
USRA's effort to use excess Spartan

rocket assets. Following this
meeting, USRA gained support
from Marshall Space Flight Center
and Sandia National Laboratories to
help quantify the key points
associated with the use of Spartan
assets. On May 20, 1993, USRA
held a follow-up briefing with Mr.
Goldin and senior NASA
management that included
representatives from DoD, the U.S.
Air Force, and the university
community. At this meeting, Mr.
Goldin challenged USRA to
demonstrate the launch of three
polar-orbiting spacecraft in a threeyear period commencing in
government fiscal year 1994. NASA
promised $24 million in funding to
support these missions with a
requirement that the program
could not overrun this allocation.
This effort was given the title of
Student Explorer Demonstration
Initiative (STEDI).
With the promise of $24 million in
funding, USRA proceeded to
formulate a working definition of a
"smaller-missions" complement.
On December 18, 1993, USRA
released a preliminary
Announcement of Opportunity
(AO) for the STEDI missions to over
1,000 university researchers,
industry representatives, and
government scientists and
managers. Serving as a continual
undercurrent to the AO was Dr.
Coleman's working definition of a
"smaller-missions" complement 1 :
• Total cost per mission of $4 to
$8 million
• Twenty-five launches per year
1 Universities Space Research
Association letter, dated 6/2/93, Dr.
Paul Coleman
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• Launch vehicle and launch
costs between $1 and $2
million.
• More than 300 pounds to low
earth orbit (SOO-km altitude,
low-inclination) or equivalent
• Start up to lift off in six
months
• Ability to ship and shoot in
thirty days, if needed
While the preliminary AO
baselined the use of excess
Minuteman II assets as the
projected expendable launch
vehicle, NASA's Launch Vehicles
Office initiated an internal study in
January 1994 to assess the cost
effectiveness of using these assets2 .
Based on information received from
the U.S. Air Force, it was
determined that the cost of using
Minuteman II assets was not
significantly lower than
commercially available launch
services, given the uncertainty of
non-recurring costs. Coupled with
the proposed U.S. Government
policy regarding expendable launch
vehicles 3, this determination led to
a NASA decision in April 1994 to
pursue a commercial procurement
of launch services for STEDI to be
called Ultralite. The Ultralite
expendable launch vehicle baseline
reqUired the capability to place a
300 pound payload into a 300 nmi.
circular polar orbit.
NASA's decision to proceed with an
Ultralite launch service was
paralleled by USRA's May 12, 1994,
release of a formal AO for the STEDI
2NASA letter, dated 3/4/94, C. Gunn
(NASA code SV) to Col. Charles P.
Pugsley, SAFIAQQS
3National Space Transportation
Policy, 8/5/94

mlssIOns. At NASA's direction, this
AO was modified in June 1994 to
require a minimum payload fairing
length of 36 inches, rather than the
original 70 inches, to enable
broader competition4. Efforts
accelerated in August of 1994 with
USRA's receipt of Sixty-six STEDI
proposals and NASA's issuance of
the Request For Proposal (RFP) for
UELVS in the Commerce Business
Daily. Consistent with the
smaller-better-faster" philosophy,
the RFP emphasized NASA's
requirement to maximize value and
stated that price, payload volume
and performance would be primary
selection factors s.
/I

Sixty-six proposals in-hand, USRA
proceeded with the rather daunting
task of selecting six of the proposals
for Phase I, Mission Definition
studies. After multiple meetings of
a body of very experienced
evaluators, winners were
announced on September 23, 1994 6.
At this point, the four-month Phase
I clock began for the winners.
Adding to these accomplishments
in September, NASA received
formal proposals in response to the
Ultralite RFP and initiated its
internal reviewl selection process at
the Goddard Space Flight Center.
On November IS, 1994, NASA
announced that Orbital Sciences
Corporation (OSC) had been
4NASA letter, dated 6/8/94, W.
Huntress (Associate Administrator for
Space Science) to Dr. Paul Coleman
(USRA)
Sibid.
6USRA, Center For Advanced Space
Studies, Division of Educational
Programs, Press Release, dated
9/23/94

2. Establish strong lines of
communication among NASA,
spacecraft and launch vehicle
personnel;
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3. Reduce the level of NASA
technical oversight over the
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selected by NASA
to negotiate a
firm fixed price contract to provide
launch services to deploy Ultraliteclass payloads into their required
orbits."7 While the government
procurement was not yet complete,
the finish line was in sight.
Implementing "lessons learned"
from previous firm-fixed-price
launch services contracts and
staying true to the "smaller-betterfaster" intent of Ultralite, the
contract with OSC was signed on
December 23, 1994.
Ii •••

With the launch vehicle defined,
USRA's STEDI review panel and the
six Phase I winners now had a
IIgiven" for the launch vehicle
environment and electrical/
mechanical interfaces where there
was previously a "might be".
Armed with this information and a
wealth of personal experience, the
STEDI review panel began its
whirlwind down select activity in
February 1995. Meeting with each
of the six finalists over a two week
period, the panel digested the
accumulated information and
made its decision. Two Phase II
selections-Student Nitric Oxide
Explorer (SNOE) and Tomographic
Experiment using Radiative
Recombinative Ionospheric
Extreme ultraviolet and Radio
Sources (TERRIERS) missions-were
announced on February 25, 1995 8 .
With the launch vehicle and
missions defined and
approximately $12M allocated for

7NASA News Press Release, dated
11115/94, 4:00 p.m., EST, RELEASE C94ii
8USRA, Center For Advanced Space
Studies, Press Release, dated 2/15/95

each mission,9 the evolution of Dr.
Coleman's embryonic 1989 vision
into the entity that is the Ultralite
Launch Services was complete. The
"smaller-better-faster" UEL VS/
STEDI operational paradigm was
born into the NASA Mixed Fleet
world.
Making "Smaller-Better-Faster"
Work
It has long been said that an
organization will resist change until
the pain of resisting is greater than
the pain associated with the
change. In the case of the Ultralite
launch service, the budget
guideline established by Mr. Goldin
made change mandatory. The only
question was how to minimize the
pain and ensure mission success.
The following four prong approach
to pain mitigation has been
adopted and implemented:
1. Form a small, multi-talented
NASA team and promote an
entrepreneurial management
approach;

9 Approximately $4.3M for each
spacecraft (design/fabrication/onorbit activities) and approximately
$7.7M per mission for launch
services (includes $ for NASA
management/technical oversight of
OSC, mission-specific modifications
requested by the spacecraft and
launch delay contingency)
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launch vehicle consistent with
the resources at risk and,
4. Establish well-defined
spacecraft-to-launch vehicle
interfaces, standard launch
services, and non-standard
launch services.
The following sections describe
specifics of each of these prongs and
accomplishments to date in making
smaller-better-faster" work.
1/

Small, entrepreneurial NASA team
With less than $300,000 allocated
per mission for OLS Project's
programmatic/technical support
Ultralite has, from the start,
'
required a significant departure in
management philosophy from the
established Medium and Small
Expendable Vehicle Services
(MELVS and SELVS). The OLS
Project's Ultralite team (Figure 1)
has embraced the following
operational imperatives:
1. "Open-book" understanding
of the Ultralite budget - while
the team does not have financial
books in the sense that a small
commercial company does, each
member of the team does
understand what the established
manpower level is (2.4 Full Time
Equivalent (FTE) civil servants,
1.2 FTE contractor) to support
both missions and how much
funding is available for mission
specific non-standard services
($750,000 per mission 10 ). The
l0It should be noted that, at this time,
the SNOE and TERRIERS missions do
not require any non-standard
services. In theory, this makes the
allocated money available for future
missions.

:

VAFlIRilp
~

,

:

-- .

ltudykderman
,, ---...

:

,

,_

.

~

~

:". ~~":

~

~remenl

'

~rL.S=

:

____ J_

.
" '. "vSG"' • "

'"',

:~_~~~J '------, '-- ~ ... -'
Figure 1. The OLS Project's Ultralite Team
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team receives a monthly
manpower report that lists all
civil servant charges against the
job order numbers established
for the SNOE and TERRIERS
missions.
2. Entrepreneurial!
bootstrapping spirit - as Figure
1 shows, the team consists of
three core people: the Launch
Service Manager (LSM), the
Mission Manager (MM), and the
Launch Service Coordinator
(LSC). What the figure doesn't'
show, however, is the
entrepreneurial, bootstrapping
spirit behind the team. Each
team member understands that
the STEDI, and thus the UELVS,
program is a pilot to
demonstrate that "smallerbetter-faster" can work. As such,
"it's not my job" is not an
accepted comment. Each team
member, in addition to treating
his/her part of the overall effort
as if it were their own
"company", is expected to
understand the efforts of the
other team members. Based on
their "open-book"
understanding of the budget,
each person knows exactly what
he/she has to work with. A
recent example of this
entrepeneurship is the Mission
Manager's initiative to
investigate alternate launch

'
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vehicle structures for possible
NASA secondary payloads. This
effort was made within his
manpower ceiling and was
facilitated by the bootstrapping
aspect of the team.
Another aspect of the Ultra lite
team that is not indicated by
Figure 1 is the fact that the three
core people also manage the OLS
Project's Titan II expendable
launch service that supports
NOAA's TIROS weather satellite
program. The sine wave nature
of launch service programmatic/
technical support (peak being
the actual launch operations)
means the team's work load
fluctuates between the two
services even though the
allocated manpower budget
stays constant. The
bootstrapping aspect of the team
is facilitated by this
management arrangement.
Through careful planning, the
team has been able to optimize
the return on budgeted
manpower by applying civil
servant support from other
Directorates within GSFC while
the core team members were
otherwise occupied on Titan IIrelated efforts. This situation
also applies to programmatic/
engineering tools already in
place in support of the Titan II
effort. Where applicable, they
are also utilized for Ultra lite
efforts. It is a given that the
team fully utilizes all aspects of
the OLS Project's existing
infrastructure to the maximum
extent possible. In cases where
hardware or software required
for an Ultralite task does not
currently exist within the OLS
Project, a search encompassing

GSFC surplus assets and other
GSFC projects is made before a
new procurement is initiated.
To date, only one Ultralitespecific procurement has been
necessary-a piece of
management software
purchased in order to comply
with licensing requirements.
Communication
As many small commercial
companies have demonstrated, just
adopting an entrepreneurial,
bootstrapping approach does not
ensure success. Without well
defined means of communication
that are fully utilized, failure will
come-it's just a matter of when.
The OLS/OSC/Spacecraft projects'
Ultralite team (Figure 2) has put a
premium on establishing and
maintaining good lines of
communication. This effort takes
multiple forms. As shown in Table
I, there are defined Orientation,
Mission Integration Working
Group (MIWG) and Launch
Operations Working Group
(LOWG) meetings. In an effort to
mitigate the effect of limited travel
budgets and optimize the face-toface contact between NASA, OSC,
and spacecraft engineers/managers,
the MIWGs alternate between
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Figure 2. The OLS lose I Spacecraft Project's Ultralite Team
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Table 1. Summary of Workinll Group Meetinlls
~

l2.illi:
L-24M
L-21M

L-18M
(After
PIL
PDR)
L·12M
(After

MWing
~
Orient.
Briefinll
MIWG
#1

MIWG
#2
MIWG
#3

PIL
CDR)
L-8M

LOWG
#1

L·6M

MIWG
#4

L·4M

LOWG
#2

L·3Od

MRR

L-3d
L-ld

FRR
LRR

~

UELV Kick-Off Meeting
IdentiMnl! Responsibilities
- PIL Questionnaire
• Outline ICD
- Prelim. Mass Properties
- Draft ARAR
• Preliminary Drawings
- Updated Mass Properties
• Prel MElEE Interfaces
• Environments
- Final Drawings
- Updated Mass Properties
• Definitize Interfaces
• Environments
Range Coordination
Working Groups: Discuss
Detailed Operational
Concerns & Plans as Stated
in the Operations Directive.
Topics Include: Launch
Ops, Countdown Manual.
PIL Support, Mission
Peculiar Supoort Rea'ts
• Finalize ME/EE Interfaces
• Final Mass Properties
• Final ARAR
• Review Launch Site
Procedures
PIL Procedure Review:
Review and Comment on

I

PIL

I:'~"'OO""'d='
ch Assessment of

ed LV!Payloadl
Readiness
Summary Status of LV & All
Supporting Elements is
Presented to NASA
Final Assessment of Readi·
ness Prior to Activation of
Range Resources on Day of
Launch

LQgillQn

I

OSC
PIL
Provider
OSC

P!L
Provider
VAFB

OSC

VAFB
OSC
NASAl

GSFC
VAFB

OSC's Dulles, Virginia, site and the
spacecraft project sites. The LOWG
meetings must occur at
Vandenberg Air Force Base,
California, (VAFB) to facilitate the
support of Western Range
personnel (civilian and Air Force)
and to allow spacecraft personnel to
see the facilities that they will
operate within during spacecraftto-launch vehicle integration
operations and actual launch
operations. In keeping with the
smaller-better-faster" principle
behind Ultralite, the number of
LOWG meetings is limited to twonot the normal four held for a
typical Small Explorer payload
launched under SELVS and
scheduled during the overall flow
II

of launch-related activities to
optimize their productivity.
Unique to the Ultralite
communication effort has been a
concerted effort to have the OLS
and OSC team members intimately
involved in the spacecraft projects'
design activities to ensure
spacecraft-to-Iaunch vehicle
compatibility and to provide for
the transferal of knowledge gained
from prior NASA and commercial
experiences. The main mechanism
for this has been the OLS and OSC
team members' involvement in the
SNOE and TERRIERS Critical Design
Reviews (CDRs).
Wrapped around the scheduled
CDRs, MIWG meetings, and LOWG
meetings is a network of almost
daily communication. All members
of the Ultralite team are tied
together via e-mail over the
Internet, fax machines, voice mail,
and phone-with free video
conferencing over the Internet still
in the works. To date, this
communication network has been
used to (1) conduct telecons on
technical issues and review mission
status on a monthly basis, (2)
transmit draft Interface Control
Documents (ICDs) and mechanical
drawings (both electronic format
and hard copies), and (3) relay
spacecraft and launch vehicle status
information on an as-necessary
basis.
The OLS Project core team has taken
communication another step
forward by locating the three core
members within thirty feet of each
other in the OLS Project's facility
(the LSM and MM share an office,
with the LSC just down the
corridor) and by employing

8

portable computers equipped with
telecommunication packages. As
studies have shown, close
proximity promotes contact l l . To
date, the OLS team has proven this
to be true. In addition to daily
conversations, the team meets on a
weekly basis to review action items,
the team's activity calendar, and
the integrated spacecraft/launch
vehicle schedule.
Mobile computing has proven
invaluable to date, allowing each
person to have his/her office" with
them regardless of where they are.
For example, this paper was
written, in part, on a train, in the
office, at home, and in hotel rooms
in Colorado and New Jersey, with
draft versions transmitted to
reviewers via e-mail and fax. From a
purely technical standpOint, the
team's Mission Manager has
equipped his portable to support
thermal and structural analyses
while he is in the field, with
thermal work having already been
performed. Productivity continues
when team members leave the
office!
Ii

The last important piece of
communication is documentation.
In keeping with the "smaller-betterfaster" intent of Ultralite,
documentation has been pared
down to those items that have the
maximum return on the time
invested. The Ultralite contract has
only twenty-eight items on its
Contract Documentation
Requirements List (CDRL)-only

11 Professor Thomas Allen of MIT.
Probability of communicating at least
once a week >2S% once distance is Sm
or less (-8% when distance -10m)

eleven requiring NASA approval
(Table 2), while the SELVS
contract has fifty-nine itemstwenty-four requiring NASA
approval. The "maximum return"
items on Ultra lite include the
spacecraft-to-Iaunch vehicle
interface control document (ICD),
integrated spacecraft/launch
vehicle coupled loads and thermal
analyses, integrated mission
constraints document, and the final
mission analysiS. The
documentation required of each
spacecraft project (Table 3) is
identified during that spacecraft
project's orientation briefing and
becomes a part of the integrated
spacecraft/launch vehicle schedule.
Table 2. CDRL Items Requiring NASA A ,proval
Allllroval Decision
TItle
ReQUired Within
Item
(Calendar Days)
No.
15
Coupled Dynam. Loads Analysis
4
I/F Control Document (ICD)
IS
5
UELV/P/L lnt .Thermal Analysis
6
30
IS
Final Mission Analysis
12
PIL Integrated Test Procedure
IS
14
Molecular & Particulate
15
16
Contamination Analysis
15
Mission Success Criteria
18
30
Mission FailurelAnom. Report
22
Integ Mission Constraints Doc.
26
15
P/L Envelope Clearance Analysis
15
27
28
Dual PIL Compatability Assess.
15

Table 3. Documentation Provided b the SIC Contractor

L-42
L-36
L-20
L·IS
L-20
L+2
L+8

PIL Launch Site Test Procedures
P/L Mass Pro erties Document
Postlaunch Orbit Confirmation Data
Mission Success Determination (TBD b NASA)
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In addition to the contractually
identified documentation, every
member of the overall Ultralite
team has an individual copy of the
Ultralite User's Guide which details
all services available to the
spacecraft project(s). This guide is
kept current by OSC throughout
the duration of the Ultralite
contract. Finally, to make sure no
spacecraft concerns regarding the
total Ultralite service inadvertently
fall through the cracks, the OLS
Project team sends out
questionnaires to the spacecraft
projects following the mission kickoff orientation briefing and every
six months thereafter. The sixmonth questionnaires are
generated by the OLS Project's
Mission Analysis and Integration
group with the results reviewed by
OLS Project upper management.

UELVS
SNOE and TERRIERS
-$4.2M per mission for
spacecraft fabrication
and one year of onorbit operations
SELVS
TOMS-EP
-$68M for spacecraft
fabrication and one
year of on-orbit
operations ($9M
actually budgeted for 3
years on-orbit)
FAST
-$43M for spacecraft
fabrication and one
year of on-orbit
operations ($15M
actually budgeted for 2
years on-orbit)

Technical Oversight
Based on the "limited resources at
risk", a decision was made by
NASA's Associate Administrator for
Space Science 12 that the language
contained in the Ultralite contract
regarding NASA technical oversight
of the Ultralite launch service
provided by OSC was to be applied
in lieu of NASA Management
Instruction (NMI) 8610.23. To help
quantify the concept of "limited
resources at risk", the following
apples-to-oranges" comparison
between UELVS spacecraft and
SELVS13 spacecraft is prOvided:
Ii

12NASA letter, S/Associate
Administrator for Space Science to
GSFC Attn: 280/Chief, Program
Procurement Division, dated 7127/94
13Personal communication with Mr.
Philip Sabelhaus, TOMS-EP PM, and
Mr. Tim Gehringer, FAST PM

In an attempt to ensure that there
would be no misinterpretation of
the intent of this decision regarding
scaling back NASA's oversight role,
the OLS Ultralite team generated a
GSFC internal oversight policy that
was distributed to all parties within
GSFC who might be involved with
UELVS in the future 14 . Because the
Ultralite team is committed to
mission success, this scaling back of
mandatory NASA oversight has
been balanced by a "smaller-betterfaster" approach to NASA
oversight-it goes by the simple
name of "teamwork". Working
cooperatively with OSC, the OLS
team will actively participate in
OSC's internal readiness review
process, which has been
14NASA letter, 470/UELVS Launch
Services Manager to Distribution,
dated 5126/95

10
documented as part of the GSFC
internal oversight policylS. The
OLS team has implemented, with
OSC, a mission-specific launch
vehicle hardware tracking system
that provides for a monthly
summary of the status of all launch
vehicle hardware deSignated for
Ultralite missions. In conjunction
with these efforts, the OLS Ultra lite
team once again applies
bootstrapping techniques. In this
case, it is gaining launch vehicle
insight from SELVS (which
complies with the requirements of
NMI 8610.23), which also utilizes
OSC's Pegasus® XL launch vehicle.
Well defined interfaces and
standard/non-standard services
Does the spacecraft really
understand the launch vehicle
environment it will travel to orbit
in and the electrical/mechanical
interfaces it will mate with? This is
a question that historically is
always asked but usually not early
enough in the spacecraft's
design/fabrication process to head
off costly launch vehicle and/or
spacecraft modifications later on.
For "smaller-better-faster" to work,
this is a critical question that must
be asked early on and continually
throughout the spacecraft's design
and fabrication phases. Starting
with the initial discussions with
OSC to finalize the UELVS contract
language, a concerted effort has
been made to ensure that all
members of the Ultralite team have
the same understanding of the
standard and non-standard services
offered and the related launch
vehicle environments and
interfaces. In a change from
15ibid.

previous launch services contract
negotiations, the GSFC negotiation
team in several instances actually
included language submitted in
OSC's UELVS proposal addressing
launch vehicle environments and
interfaces in the final version of the
contract-once it had been agreed
that the GSFC team's interpretation
of the wording matched OSC's. An
example of the flip side of this was
where OSC had proposed a
mechanical interface that was not
yet flight proven as part of the
UELVS standard services. The GSFC
team deleted it from the final
version of the contract, with the
provision that OSC would be able to
resubmit it for inclusion once the
interface had flight heritage and
NASA had approved the design via
an OSC-funded CDR presented to
NASA. In short, all spacecraft
interfaces had to have flight
heritage and all launch vehicle
environments had to be consistent
with recorded operational data
from prior Pegasus® missions
before the UELVS contract was
signed.
As shown in Table 4, the standard
services offered to spacecraft
projects under UELVS are
subdivided under Electrical/
Telemetry, Mechanical, and Launch
Operations headings. This is the
menu that comes with the firmfixed $6M launch service price
tag16 . This menu is backed by the
Ultra lite User's Guide, which is the
product of a joint OLS/OSC effort to
produce a document that
16$6M if ordered prior to 111/96, with
inflation-based, pre-priced ordering
periods extending through 12/31199e.g.,. $7.11M if ordered between
111199 and 12/31199

I
I,

I
I

I
I
I
I
I

'I
I

,
I

I
I
,t
t
I
I

I
I
I

,

I I

Telemetry

Mechanical

I
I
I

,
I
I
J

Launch
Operations

Maximum 4 discrete teleme
si nals
Class 100,000 Cleanroom Operations
Maximum 2 mission-specific payload
fairin access doors
Continuous Ale service from fairing
closure until Pe asus release
Dry GN 2 purge using grade B quality
nitro en
Separation Sytsems: choice of 38", 23" or
17" diameter with associated attach
hardware
46" diameter dynamic envelope, up to 70"
long (P IL fairing - cylinder transitions to
an 0 ive)
Coordination with Western Range
P/L integration at Vandenberg AFB, CA
Meetings per mission:
4 Mission Int Working Group (MIWGs)
2 Launch Ops Working Grp (LOWGs)
- 1 Mission Readiness Review (MRR)
Technical Interface Meetings (TlMs),
as re uired

Figure 4, 23 Inch Separable Payload Interface - Forward View Looking Aft

-.

Figure 5. 23 Inch Separable Payload [nterface - Stde View
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provides maximum benefit to the
Ultralite team's potential
customers. Figures 3 through 6
have been taken directly from the
most current version of the User's
Guide and reflect a general
overview of the detail included in
the document.
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In yet another instance of the
"smaller-better-faster" philosophy
behind the Ultralite effort, the
number of non-standard services
offered (Table 5) is less than a third
of those in place under the SELVS
contract. This limitation precludes
the spacecraft-driven escalation of
launch services costs that have
occurred in the past under the
SELVS and MELVS efforts. This
limited list of non-standard services
is complemented by a predetermined price list that
eliminates the need for complicated

I
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Table 5 Non Standard Services
Class 10,000 Cleanroom Operations
Alternative range services at Wallops Flight Facility (WFF),
VA (25 65° inclination)
Payload propellant loading
Hydrocarbon pre-filter replacement
Payload electrical interface testing at contractor site
Secondary Payload
0

-

consumer price index related
calculations of the prices in the
future-yet another contractual
"first" for NASA firm-fixed-price
launch services contracts.
In light of the growing interest
within the NASA science
community regarding Ultralite's
secondary payload non-standard
service, the OLS/OSC Ultralite team
undertook an internal, cooperative
effort that has resulted in a greatly
enhanced contractual definition of
this $4.SM service-subsequently
inserted into the UELVS contract as
a no-cost, administrative change.
This enhanced definition of a
service, and its related interfaces is a
good example of the Ultra lite
team's continuing efforts to make
"smaller-better-faster" work.
Summary
Faced with a direct challenge from
the NASA Administrator, the
Ultralite launch services team is
well on its way towards proving
that a "smaller-better-faster"
operational paradigm will work for
NASA firm-fixed-price launch
service contracts. The UELVS
implementation has coupled a
group of highly motivated
OLS/OSC/Spacecraft project
personnel with management tenets
taken from the entrepreneurial,
small company, commercial
community and well defined
launch vehicle environments/

interfaces. This union has set the
stage for the birth of a new
generation of restricted budget,
maximum science return on
investment spacecraft/launch
vehicle efforts-currently set to
occur with the launches of the
SNOE and TERRIERS missions in
early 1997.
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